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ABSTRACT 
 
I situate historically, analyze, and examine some of the implications of Kant‟s thesis that the analytic unity of 
apperception – the representation of the identity of the I think – is what transforms any representation to which it is 
attached into a universal (conceptus communis). 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Kant‟s most revolutionary innovation in the theory of understanding was to treat self-
consciousness – the unity of apperception – as more fundamental to the nature of understanding 
than any discursive operation such as conception, judgment, or reasoning.  As such, the 
understanding not only underlies the possibility of cognitive experience and its objects but the 
possibility of thought itself – discursivity, representations by means of universals, be it cognitive 
or non-cognitive – and even the unity of the manifold in pure space and time.  If interpreters 
have all but completely ignored these non-cognitive – or, better, pre-cognitive – roles of 
apperception/understanding, it is, in my view, because they mistakenly regard the categories as 
necessary conditions for unity of apperception.  For being necessary conditions of the possibility 
of experience and its objects does not make the categories necessary conditions of apperception 
itself, and, on more than one occasion, Kant explicitly asserted the opposite: that the unity of 
apperception is presupposed both by the categories and the logical functions from which these 
concepts derive (B131, A401).
1
  
  In this essay, I shall explore one of the pre-categorial roles of the unity of apperception 
in Kant‟s theory of understanding: its grounding of the possibility of understanding even in its 
general logical employment.  I will show how the unity of apperception serves to extend the 
unrestrictedly universal scope of the logician‟s notion of logical universality from language to 
prelinguistic mentation, and does so without introducing the kind of abstraction to which 
Empiricists like Berkeley and Hume objected, or reverting to the kind of Platonistic 
intellectualism characteristic of the innatism of Descartes and Leibniz or the illuminationism of 
Malebranche.  And, finally, I will consider how this innovation, when coupled with innate logical 
functions of judgment, opens the way to non-linguistic propositional thought, including, not 
least, synthetic a priori judgment. 
 
A. Rationalist and Empiricist conceptions of universals 
Prior to Kant, early modern exponents of the theory of ideas anchored linguistic universality in 
consciousness in either of two ways.  According to the first, favored by Rationalists and modeled 
after Plato, there exist ideas of universal natures related to their instances as archetypes to 
ectypes.  In the world outside our minds, the archetypes are ideas in the divine intellect and the 
ectypes created things.  Within the mind, the archetypes, be they the divine ideas themselves 
(Spinoza, Malebranche) or innate ideas endowed by the creator in the image of the creator‟s own 
ideas (Descartes, Arnauld, Leibniz), are accessible to consciousness only non-sensibly, by means 
                                                 
1In this essay, I shall abbreviate as AA volumes from  the Prussian Academy edition of the Gesammelte Schriften, 
begun in 1901 but still ongoing.  In addition, I shall employ the following abbreviations for particular works: A--/B-- 
(Critique of Pure Reason), PFM (Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics), Logic (the Jäsche text), and THN (A Treatise of 
Human Nature) with pagaination from the Selby-Bigge/Nidditch and the David Fate Norton editions separated by 
„/‟. 
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of pure intellect, which employs them as patterns for molding sense experience into recognizable 
objects. 
 Descartes, for example, held that ideas innate to intellect are in one respect ectypes and in 
another archetypes.  They are ectypal insofar as they are images of true and immutable natures in 
the divine intellect and archetypal insofar as they enable us to recognize, say, a piece of beeswax 
from one concatenation of sensory data (and any that resemble it), men in hats and coats 
crossing the square below from another, a circle from still another, and so on.  Thus, ontological 
meaning (termed „objective reality‟ by Descartes) can be accorded to linguistic universals only 
insofar as they correspond to images in the intellect of true and immutable natures in the divine 
mind.  Otherwise, however indispensable to discourse, they are ontologically null – as arbitrary 
and convention-bound as rules of etiquette. 
 The second way of elucidating the mental underpinnings of linguistic universality, favored by 
Empiricists, is psychological.  One begins by distinguishing one idea from another by 
discernment, comparing them with an eye to their differences, and finally abstracting from those 
differences (including individuating circumstances) so as to leave only that feature or features in 
which they resemble, be it in quality, structure, relation, cause, effect, or co-occurrence.  The 
resulting abstract idea is then ready to be used as a universal to designate anything that resembles 
it in the relevant respect(s), however different otherwise; and this potential is actualized when the 
resemblance association is reinforced with sufficient frequency and constancy to ingrain a habit 
which thereafter lies ready to be triggered by any appropriately resembling stimulus.  In this way, 
even a creature without language can, for example, recognize an apple as an apple by means of 
the habit triggered by sensing it, at least in the sense that it forms beliefs about what it perceives 
on the basis of its past experience of the resembling objects originally responsible for instilling 
the habit: that it is edible, how ripe it is, how it would taste, how it would behave if hurled, and 
so on. 
 Though Rationalists sometimes employed elements of the psychological account of 
universality to explain how we perceive and operate with the universal ideas of pure intellect, its 
attraction to Empiricists was that it offered a way to explain universality itself without having 
recourse to such ideas.
2
  Instead of a special kind of idea, in itself universal and accessible only to 
pure intellect, they held universality to consist in a certain kind of significative use to which 
ordinary sensibly-derived ideas may be put.  An idea, individual in itself, can be used to designate 
many resembling things indifferently, without singling any out, by supervening on a customary 
resemblance association; and by supervening on different such customs the very same idea can 
be used to designate different things that resemble it in different ways.
3
 
 This psychologizing of universality does, to be sure, create a gulf between linguistic 
universality and its mental correspondent.  Linguistic universality, considered formally, without 
regard to content or context, is unrestricted in scope.  That indeed is why it lends itself so well to 
quantificational analysis.  It certainly does not, either implicitly or explicitly, limit the scope of a 
general term to all and only what speakers with a certain psychological endowment are capable of 
                                                 
2One could argue, however, that theists like Locke and Berkeley could not entirely escape the Platonic archetype 
model of universality since the intellect of God must know things as they really are, including universals such as 
essences and laws, without in any way relying on resemblance relations and habit, sensation (passive affection), or 
anything else specific to the psychology of finite minds.  
3
As Hume put it: „If ideas be particular in their nature, and at the same time finite in their number, ‟tis only by 
custom they can become general in their representation, and contain an infinite number in their representation... 
Nay so entire is the custom, that the very same idea may be annext to several different words, and may be employ‟d 
in different reasonings, without any danger of mistake. Thus the idea of an equilateral triangle of an inch 
perpendicular may serve us in talking of a figure, of a rectilinear figure, of a regular figure, of a triangle, and of an 
equilateral triangle. All these terms, therefore, are in this case attended with the same idea; but as they are wont to be 
apply‟d in a greater or lesser compass, they excite their particular habits, and thereby keep the mind in a readiness to 
observe, that no conclusion be form‟d contrary to any ideas, which are usually compriz‟d under them‟ (THN 24/21 
and 21/20).  
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producing in their minds.  Consequently, insofar as Empiricists accorded at most semantic but 
never ontological meaning to whatever in language cannot be underwritten by the acts and 
affects present to the conscious mind, linguistic universality is not so much explained as 
explained away on conceptions of mental universality like theirs.  Kinds, laws, and other 
universals in language, to the extent they can be accorded any extra-linguistic significance at all, 
are reduced to mere psychological affairs of resemblance, abstraction from individuating 
circumstances, and customary association.  Otherwise, they are just conventional contrivances, 
useful or even indispensable to human communication, but with nothing to anchor them in 
what, for Empiricists, is the only reality that can ever present itself to us: our own ideas.
4
   
 
B. Kant’s account of universals 
At first sight, Kant‟s view of how language is anchored in consciousness may not seem very 
different from those of the Empiricists, at least when considered from the vantage of pure 
general logic.  Like them, Kant held that „we can understand nothing except what carries with it a 
correspondent in intuition to our words‟ (A277/B333).  How one advances from sensible 
intuitions to general representations (discursivity) he explained in similar fashion.  Concepts have 
both a matter – the object (contents) thought in them – and a form, universality, understood as 
the representation of what is common to things that may otherwise be quite different.  From the 
standpoint of what he termed „pure general logic,‟ where the matter of concepts is disregarded 
and only their form as universals considered, Kant explained the acquisition of concepts from 
intuitions as follows: 
In order to make concepts from representations, one thus has to be able to compare, reflect, 
and abstract; for these three logical operations of the understanding are the essential and 
universal conditions for the generation of any concept whatsoever. – I see, e.g., a spruce, a 
willow, and a linden.  By first of all comparing these objects to one another, I observe that 
they differ from one another in respect of their trunk, the branches, the leaves, and such 
like; but next I reflect on what they have in common, trunk, branches, and leaves 
themselves, and abstract from their size, shape, etc.; thus do I obtain the concept of a tree.  
(L 94-5) 
 
Comparison consists in discerning the distinguishable features of each sensible object and noting 
how they differ from those of other objects; reflection detects those features in which the 
objects compared resemble; and finally, when abstraction is made from the differences, the 
resemblances that remain are ready for employment as a concept. 
  Also in common with the Empiricists, Kant conceived of abstraction as leaving out of 
consideration.  The representation considered retains its character as an individual apprehended 
in intuition – its myriad qualities, relations, and everything else about it are unaffected by 
abstraction.  The abstracting subject simply attends to certain features while ignoring others, and 
then uses the contents thus isolated as a standard to sort through its other representations, 
ranking under it those that resemble it in all and only those features it considers (regardless of 
how they otherwise differ), while excluding all the rest.  Other concepts can be produced from 
the same sensible individual simply by considering different features and leaving others out of 
consideration.  And, in principle, the reflecting subject can derive as many concepts from a given 
intuition as there are features to consider and leave out of consideration. 
  Up to this point, then, the only noteworthy difference between Kant‟s account of 
universality and the sort advanced by Berkeley and Hume is the exclusion of custom.  Custom 
closes a gap that arises because comparisons with an eye to resemblances have to be performed 
one at a time and so cannot explain how universals come to represent all ideas that resemble 
                                                 
4The discussion in this section is based on my book, Kant and the Empiricists, New York: Oxford University Press, 
2005. 
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them, actual or possible, whether comparisons are performed or not.
5
  The solution advanced by 
Berkeley and adapted by Hume was to explicate the idea of logical universality in terms not of 
actual but possible comparisons by tracing it to the idea of the power to perform them.  The 
power to perform comparisons with a given abstract idea extends to every possible idea, and so 
permits one to conceive the scope of the abstracted idea as extending to all, some, or none of the 
infinite totality of possible ideas.  And „power‟, in this context, Berkeley and Hume explicated in 
terms of customary association in relations of resemblance: habits that lie in readiness to be 
triggered by any perception that possesses all the features represented in the idea employed as a 
standard of comparison, however much it may differ otherwise. 
  Kant, however, obviated the need for customary association by proposing a 
revolutionary new account of the mental underpinnings of logical universality.  Its clearest and 
most developed statement is a footnote in §16 of the B edition Transcendental Deduction of the 
Categories according to which the I think, qua analytic unity of apperception, is constitutive of 
logical universality.  The reasoning that leads to this conclusion starts from the premise, first, 
that „The I think must be able to accompany all my representations, for otherwise something 
would be represented in me that could not be thought at all, which is as much as to say the 
representations would either be impossible or at least be nothing for me,‟ and, second, that this 
requires that the manifold of all possible sensible intuitions, „ahead of all thought,‟ have „a 
necessary relation to the I think in the same subject in which this manifold is found‟ (B131-2).  
On this basis, Kant advanced what is perhaps the most fundamental and important thesis of his 
critical philosophy: „it is only because I can combine a manifold of given representations in one 
consciousness that it is possible for me to represent to myself the identity of the consciousness in these 
representations, that is, the analytic unity of apperception is possible only on the presupposition of 
some such synthetic unity‟ (B133).  To be able to represent the identity of consciousness in respect 
of all the manifold, and so represent one and the same I think as able to accompany each and every 
one of my possible representations – the analytic unity of apperception – I must already have 
united, by synthetic combination, all sensible representations in one and the same consciousness 
– synthetic unity of apperception.  Any representations that cannot be brought within the unity 
of this consciousness, even if they are not impossible, can be nothing to me, and so, as far as my 
thinking and action are concerned, may as well be nothing. 
  Having determined the a priori relation of the unity of consciousness to the 
representation of its identity, Kant appended the following footnote: 
The analytic unity of consciousness attaches to all common concepts as such, e.g., if I think 
red in general, then I represent thereby a feature that, as a characteristic mark, can be met 
with in something or combined with other representations; hence, only by means of a pre-
thought possible synthetic unity can I represent the analytic unity.  A representation that is 
to be thought as common to differing representations is regarded as belonging to such as 
have, besides it, something different in them; consequently, it must be thought previously in 
synthetic unity with other (albeit only possible representations), before I can think in it the 
analytic unity of consciousness that makes it into a conceptus communis.  And thus the 
synthetic unity of apperception is the highest point to which all employment of the 
understanding, even the whole of logic, and in accordance with it, transcendental 
philosophy, must be attached, indeed this capacity is the understanding itself. (B133-4n) 
 
                                                 
5Rationalists avoided the difficulty because, on their view, logically universal ideas can be directly apprehended by 
the intellect and employed as standards in individual acts of comparison, and among these ideas, presumably, is the 
idea of logical universality itself.  The whole point of an Empiricist account, by contrast, is to explain how our minds 
can acquire an idea of logical universality, or at least of something that approximates it, by means of the senses and 
imagination alone, without recourse to anything supposed to be accessible only to pure intellect (e.g. THN 72/52 
and 638/39).  
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Among the many things that makes this inexplicably neglected footnote of special importance 
for comprehending Kant‟s theory of understanding is that its focus is on apperception as the 
ground of pure general logic and not, as nearly everywhere else in the Critique of Pure Reason, its 
role in the transcendental theory of cognitive experience.
6
  This means that it is not concerned 
with concepts as representations of cognizable objects, where „object‟ is understood as „that in 
the concept of which the manifold of given intuition is united‟ (B137; also A104-8, A190-1/B235-
6, and A494/B522).  Instead, it abstracts completely from all content of concepts (the 
determinations thought in the categories not excepted) and focuses solely on their logical form as 
universals capable of being met with in, and so as common to (conceptus communis), representations 
that may otherwise differ.  In short, the purely general logical context of the role accorded to the 
analytic unity of apperception in the B133-4 footnote makes it a matter of complete indifference 
whether a concept is objective or subjective, cognitive or non-cognitive, whether it represents a 
determination of space or time, a number, a color, a dread, a desire, a duty, freedom, God, a 
something in general, a nothing, or even whether or not it is internally self-contradictory. 
  The crux of Kant‟s explication of logical universality is that the analytic unity of the I 
think, in being able to accompany all possible representations a priori, is ipso facto common to them 
all, and so is aptly described as the pure form of logical universality as such.  It is also purely 
mental because nothing is at issue here except the representation of the identity of consciousness 
– the analytic unity of the I think – made possible by the synthetic unity of the manifold of 
intuition in one consciousness ahead of all thought, and so prior to and independently of all 
concepts and, a fortiori, all judgments, whether linguistic or not.  This is what makes the I think 
„the vehicle of all concepts‟ (A341B399-4100): anything sensible representation that I think, 
simply by virtue of its being me thinking it, partakes of the universality of the the analytic unity of 
apperception and so ceases to count as individual and instead takes on the value of a universal, 
that is, a representation whose scope, like that of the I think, extends to all possible 
representations and, again like the I think, is, potentially at least, common to them all possible. 
  I say „potentially‟ because, like Kant‟s example of the concept of red that results when the 
I think attaches to the sensation of red, few if any representations, other than the I think itself, 
are, in truth, common to every possible representation.  Yet, from a purely general logical point of 
view, what is or is not true is of no concern since it relates to the content of concepts and not 
just their form.  Instead, all that matters is that representations, simply by virtue of being thought 
by me, acquire the logical form of universality proper to the analytic unity of apperception. 
  There is, to be sure, a sense in which the scope of the universality constituted by the 
analytic unity of the I think is not unqualifiedly universal.  The synthetic unity of apperception it 
presupposes encompasses only representations, not things in themselves; and Kant did not quite 
preclude the possibility that representations can occur that do not belong to this unity, insisting 
only that such representations, like things in themselves, could be nothing to me (B131).  Yet, for 
precisely this reason, these restrictions on its scope are not really restrictions at all.  For how 
would understanding be handicapped if what is nothing to it, and to which it is condemned by 
the conditions of its possibility to be forever oblivious, is excluded from the scope of its 
thought?  And does the scope of linguistic universality extend farther?  Even in respect of 
language any such distinction in scope would seem to be a distinction without a difference.  
Since everything that can be anything to me is included within the scope of the analytic unity of 
consciousness, it thus seems sufficient to ground linguistic universality. 
  What then is the synthetic unity of apperception that precedes and makes possible the 
analytic unity of the I think?  Because the latter is essential to all concepts, and so to all judgment 
(propositional thought) as well, it can consist of nothing but sensible representations.  Since the 
only a priori unity of sensible representations that is in place „ahead of all thought‟ (B132) is that 
                                                 
6The part of transcendental philosophy that goes deeper even than general logic coincides with the subjective 
transcendental deduction of the categories, while the transcendental theory of cognition is the topic of the less 
fundamental objective deduction: see Axvi-xvii. 
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of the manifold in pure space and time, the manifold contained in these intuitions, and united in 
the consciousness of them, seems to be the only candidate.  Moreover, while Kant did not 
explicitly equate the synthetic unity presupposed by the analytic unity of apperception with that 
of pure space and time in the B133-4 footnote, it is probably no coincidence that he took the 
occasion in the very next footnote to make explicit that the unity of consciousness met with in 
the pure space and time of the Transcendental Aesthetic is „synthetic yet also original‟ (B136n; 
see also A99-10, A107, B140, and B160n).  And one cannot help being struck by how well their 
equation dovetails with the argument of §16 (B131-5) since it would mean that the only 
representations that could not be anything for me would be precisely those that, by failing to 
conform to pure space and time, cannot be given in intuition – cannot appear, cannot be 
apprehended – at all.   
 
C. The I think as copula of possible judgments 
With logical universality extended from language to mind, the way was opened for Kant to posit 
purely mental propositional thought (judgment) as well.  All that is needed is a means of relating 
one concept to another, and thereby combining them to form a single, conjoint representation.  
For if distinct universals were isolated from one another, incapable of being united, attaching the 
analytic unity of the I think to anything would bring no representational gain, and in particular 
nothing to affirm or deny, and so too nothing to which truth or falsity could be ascribed.   
Accordingly, the analytic unity of the I think must be supplemented by innate logical functions 
that enable representations to which the I think is attached to be united in judgments in much 
the same way the innate sensible forms posited in the Transcendental Aesthetic meet the need to 
bring together the manifold data of the senses in intuitions.
7
  
  In beings constituted like ourselves, the form that enables distinct, otherwise unrelatable 
concepts to be united is that of categorical judgment, where one concept is related to another as 
predicate to subject.  This relation also has quantitative and qualitative logical components, that 
determine the predication as universal, particular, or singular, and as affirmative, negative, or infinite.  
The addition of these forms transforms the I think from merely being the form of logical 
universality to being the copula of judgments (B141-2, AA 22 91 and 96).  For it is only insofar as 
the I think attaches to representations that they can be united as subjective and predicate of 
variously quantified and qualified categorical judgments. (B141-2).
8
  Other logical forms 
transform it further.  For once judgments are formed, some means of relating them must exist as 
well, since otherwise not only would it be impossible to form complex judgments (judgments 
that relate judgments rather than merely concepts), inference from one judgment to another 
could not take place.  Accordingly, Kant posited logical functions of judgment that permit not 
only concepts but the judgments formed from them to be combined: the logical form of 
hypothetical judgment, in which judgments are combined as ground and consequent, and 
disjunctive logical form, in which they are combined insofar as their subjects (or predicates) 
divide up the sphere of the subject (or predicate) of another judgment.  And since it is only 
insofar as the analytic unity of the I think confers its universal scope on judgments that they are 
fit to enter into these relations, the l think plays the same mediating role in complex judgment 
and inferences that it does as the copula of categorical judgments („What the copula is for 
categorical judgments, the consequentia is for hypotheticals,‟ L 105). 
  Whether or not logical functions other than those characteristic of our understanding are 
possible Kant did not think could be known (B145-6, A230/B283, Progress 272).  Nor, 
                                                 
7
Indeed, Kant drew this very analogy: „Logical form is to the intellectual representation of things precisely what 
space and time are for the appearances of a thing: namely, they contain the places for ordering them‟ (AA 17 §4629 
[early 1770s]). 
8
This, I believe, underlies Kant‟s claim that the „is‟ of predication can itself be understood as a predicate: „[T]he little 
word “is” is not still another predicate on top of these, but only what sets the predicate in relation (beziehungsweise) to 
the subject‟ (A598-9/B626-7).   
  48 
presumably, would he have claimed to know whether there are still higher level logical functions 
that combine complex judgments to form an entirely new kind of logical unity, quite beyond our 
ken (whereas, with the present constitution of our minds, we must instead content ourselves 
with the capacity of reason to represent judgments of a certain kind as a totality by means of 
ideas).  In any case, what is essential is not which logical forms characterize the constitution of the 
understanding but only its possession of some such forms by which to relate concepts and 
judgments that would otherwise be unrelatable and of no representational worth whatsoever.  
 
Conclusion 
Until the capacity to represent universality by accompanying representations with the analytic 
unity of the I think is realized, all representations in the mind are aesthetic in character: 
impressions of sense (sensations, self-affections), outer and inner appearances, and their 
reproductions in imagination.  Their manifoldness (pure and empirical synthesis of 
apprehension) and all relation of that manifold, be it a priori (productive synthesis) or a 
posteriori (association), is exclusively the work of imagination.  The universal scope of the I 
think as analytic unity of apperception can thus play no representational role here since only 
intuitions, not concepts, are relatable by means of imagination.  It therefore needs to be 
understood as a strictly logical I, not an aesthetic one: the analytic unity of apperception can 
merely accompany, not relate, aesthetic representations; a copula only of judgments, not 
syntheses of imagination.
9
   
 Yet, for precisely this reason, the advent of judgments marks a fundamental transformation 
in our representation.  Sensibility is oblivious to what is represented in judgments; their objects 
do not appear and cannot be apprehended in intuition.  Insofar as experience, as Kant 
understood it, consists of judgments (PFM 304, AA 18 §§ 5661 and 5923), its objects are not 
sensible, immediately intuitable appearances at all, but rather phenomena cognized through 
appearances by means of universals, and so objects that exist only in and through discursive 
understanding.   
 How this enables the understanding to become the author of nature itself (B127, A114, 
A125-8, B163-5, PFM 318-20) lies beyond scope of this paper.  For present purposes it suffices 
to recognize the logical significance of the transformation Kant wrought by extending 
propositional form from language to mentation.  The mental propositions of the Empiricists 
differ fundamentally from verbal ones: not only do they exclude „rules of propriety‟ 
(conventions) but grammatical and logical form as well, and so fall well within the capacity of 
imagination (i.e. aesthetic representation for Kant), including the powers of animal minds.  By 
contrast, Kant‟s ability to account for genuine universals in the mind by means of the analytic 
unity of apperception enabled him to ascribe logical form to mental propositions, so that they 
can be conceived to be both isomorphic with language and beyond the capacity of animals 
(„Animals too have apprehensiones but not apperceptiones; hence, they cannot make their 
representations universal,‟ AA 15 §411 [early 1770s]).  Thus, in a manner fully consistent with the 
commitment to the sensible origin of all representational content that he shared with the 
Empiricists, Kant was able to explain the mental underpinnings of pure general logic that open 
the way for a solution to the problem of transcendental philosophy: how is the mind capable of 
forming synthetic a priori judgments and applying them to perceptible realities?  
 
                                                 
9
This is why „The identity of the consciousness of myself in distinct times is thus only a formal condition of my 
thoughts and their interrelation (Zusammenhanges) but in no way proves the numerical identity of my subject in which, 
notwithstanding the logical identity of the I, change of such a kind can be present that does not allow its identity to 
be maintained.  Despite this, we can still always ascribe to it the same-sounding I which, in each distinct state and 
even one involving a change of subject, could yet keep the thoughts of the preceding subject going and thus carry 
them over to the succeeding one‟ (A363).  The I would be a being in time if it related intuitions as well as concepts.  
 
  
